INTRODUCTION
One very natural dividing line that-for better or worse-is often used to distinguish those who (put roughly for now) believe in God from those who do not is that between theism and atheism, where 'theism' is used to mark the believers and 'atheism' the non-believers. Such contrastive labels can serve many practical functions (e.g., signifying social identity) even when the terms in question are not clearly defined. Individuals are often, on the basis of their beliefs and values, attracted (sometimes rationally, sometimes irrationally) toward one such label more so than the other. However, once a clear statement of the substantive difference between theism and atheism is requested, things become more complicated, much more so than our casual use of these terms would suggest.
What exactly is the best way to capture the relationship between theism and atheism? To what extent are they opposed to one another, and relatedly, to what extent should they be regarded as exhausting the available theoretical options? §2 will canvass a range of responses to this cluster of questions. In §3, we explore the social-epistemic dimension of the atheism/theism divide, by focusing in particular on the issue of religious disagreements, including those disagreements that take very different assumptions as starting points.
THEISM AND ATHEISM
The 20 th century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1888 Wittgenstein ( -1951 was sceptical that any sharp definition (e.g., in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) of either theism (or by extension atheism, the denial of theism) could be fruitfully drawn. The term 'theism', which originates from the Greek term theos [θεός] meaning 'god', has historically been used to pick out a wide range of very different positions, all under the general description of 'belief in God', so many in fact that that we might wonder whether the term 'theism' (like the term 'game') is best understood as a kind of family resemblance term. Just as there is plausibly no set of conditions necessary and sufficient for counting as a game despite a cluster of properties shared by many but not all games, so likewise we might think there are no conditions necessary and sufficient for counting as 'theism' despite characteristic similarities between the views we use this term to pick out. Or so such a line of thinking would go.
Relegating 'theism' (and by extension, atheism) to nothing sharper than a family resemblance term, however, might be premature. For one thing, even if there are various kinds of differing views that purport to accept 'belief in God' (understood minimally as a divine creator of the universe), self-described theists (unlike deists) typically posit further attributes. Whereas deists deny that God either interferes in the world or reveals himself in some detectable way, theists typically maintain both of these claims. Moreover, the term 'theism' can be sharpened further by associating additional properties with God, and in particular, the classic properties attributed to God by monotheistic religions (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam): an all-powerful, all-knowing, and infinitely good creator.
Even if theism is used in this more specific sense, however, a further philosophical issue arises when it comes to defining atheism in terms of the denial of theism. For no matter how much we sharpen the notion of 'God' with reference to which theism is defined, the further characterisation of atheism as a denial of theism requires some further elaboration. For there are multiple ways one might deny theism, not all of which comport with our ordinary usage of
Atheism is typically associated with the kind of denial that is the rejection of the existence of God or other deities. Though one might also deny the existence of God in a weaker fashion, by refraining from believing in God while not outright maintaining God's non-existence, a position typically associated with agnosticism. Let's look at each of these positions in turn. (1929 -2003) . According to Williams, if we could believe at will, and moreover if this is a power that is both common and not opaque to us, then it would be very hard to explain why we should ever be surprised when things turn out to be different than we believe. But we are invariably surprised in such cases, and so Williams thought we should reject that we possess the power to believe at will.
If Hume and Williams are on the right track, then whether one is an atheist, theist or agnostic is not something over which she has direct control. And this point, if correct, has potentially important ethical implications. Consider, for example, the 'ought implies can' principle, often attributed to Immanuel Kant (1724 -1804). As Kant wrote in his 1793 book
Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason: 'For if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings.' The crux of Kant's insight here is that the very suggestion that we ought to do something implies that we should be at least capable of doing it. With reference to Kant's principle, it looks very much as though Hume's and Williams' point about the non-voluntariness of believing would have an important implication-viz., that atheism/theism beliefs, no less than other beliefs, lie beyond the realm of duty, and thus that it would be a mistake to praise or for that matter blame individuals for holding such beliefs. To avoid this kind of conclusion (as will many who take belief in God to fall within the purview of praise and blame) it looks, initially at least, as though one must take issue with either Kant's principle or with the descriptive claim that belief in God is non-voluntary in a way that (paired with Kant's principle) implies this result. another, given that religion and science offer genuinely alternative ways of coming to understand the world and our place in it, ways that issue various kinds of contradictions. At the level of methodology, for example, science forbids while at least some religions subscribe to divine revelation as a valid method; at the level of belief, Western science holds that the Earth is billions of years old, whereas some religions deny this. The non-conflict model by contrast denies that religion and science can even potentially conflict because religion and science concern nonoverlapping magisteria, or domains of authority. As American evolutionary biologist
Stephen J. Gould (1941 Gould ( -2002 , in defence of this position puts it, 'The net of science covers the empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value. These two magisteria do not overlap' (1997, §1). If Gould is right, then it is a mistake to think of science and religion as even in the market for conflict.
A third position, the potential conflict model, maintains that religion and science can potentially conflict, e.g., as in the case where a religion advances verifiable empirical claims (e.g., the age of the earth). In response to potential conflicts, however, some thinkers, including the Suppose we take 'G' to the proposition 'God exists.' You assert G, you interlocutor denies G. If your opponent if a child, or someone who you think hasn't given due consideration to the question or perhaps lacks what you take to be information relevant to answering the question, you are not going to regard (prior to the disagreement) such an individual to be as likely as you are to be right on the matter. In such a case, the fact that such an individual disagrees with you might not be very rationally significant for whether you should continue to hold your belief.
Things become much more interesting, however, when we control for such differences.
Suppose that, prior to finding out that your interlocutor disagrees with you on the matter of whether God exists, you regard your interlocutor to be an epistemic peer-viz., someone you took to be just cognitively competent and well informed on the matter at issue as you are. What does rationality require of you now that you've found out this person disagrees with you?
There are two central positions on this matter. The conciliatory view says that, in a revealed peer disagreement, rationality requires that you adjust (to some degree) your confidence that the proposition at issue is true. Thus, if you discover that someone you think is as smart and as well informed on you in matters that are relevant to determining the existence of God disagrees with you about G, then according to the conciliatory view, it is rationally impermissible to remain just as confident as you were before on the matter of whether G is true.
The steadfast view by contrast denies this claim and permits one to rationally 'hold one's grounds' in the face of a revealed peer disagreement.
It's a difficult and contentious matter in contemporary social epistemology which of these two positions is more plausible. And in the case of religious disagreement, things can get especially tricky. For example, the matter of determining who counts as an epistemic peer in the first place is relatively straightforward in the case of mundane, non-religious disagreements-say, about whether (say) a particular store is open on a Saturday. Anyone plausibly counts as your epistemic peer here provided they've been exposed to the same kind of evidence as you have and are in OK cognitive shape (i.e., not drunk, hallucinating). But in the religious case, it's not so clear, as there often times will not already be agreement on what counts as the right kind of evidence that's relevant to settling the dispute. For example, one who takes revealed scripture to be evidence relevant to the matter of whether God exists will perhaps not regard someone not acquainted with such scripture as equally likely to be right on the matter. To the extent that mutual recognition of epistemic peerhood seems more difficult to establish in the religious case than in more mundane cases where there is antecedent agreement on the matter of what kind of evidence is the relevant kind, the problem of accounting for the rational significance of religious disagreements becomes all the more philosophically challenging.
As philosopher John Pittard (2015) has suggested, one way to gain traction here is to distinguish between the first-order and higher-order epistemic significance of religious disagreements, by distinguishing more carefully between two kinds of evidence: first-order evidence which directly concerns the truth of some target proposition, p, and higher-order evidence vis-à-vis p; higher-order evidence doesn't bear directly on whether p but rather on the matter of whether one has rationally assessed the relevant first-order evidence. Thus, if the proposition under discussion is The bank is open Saturday, then the testimony of the bank's manager constitutes first-order evidence; if the bank manager also tells me that I've ingested a mindaltering pill, then this new evidence has second-order significance. It doesn't directly concern the matter of whether the bank is open, but it concerns my capacity to rationally assess the firstorder evidence I have.
With this distinction in mind, we can now briefly consider how the epistemic significance of religious disagreements might potentially differ (along the first-second-order dimension) across cases. For example, proponents of the conciliatory view will be inclined to suggest that, when we discover that someone we regard as an epistemic peer disagrees with us regarding the matter of whether God exists, this fact of such disagreement has a kind of second-order epistemic significance for us: it is not evidence that bears directly on the issue of whether God exists, but it bears (perhaps, as a kind of higher-order defeater) on our own ability to assess the first-order evidence.
By contrast, as Pittard notes, religious disagreement might also have a kind of first-order significance. Here, it will be helpful to briefly consider J.L. Schellenberg's (1959 -) problem of divine hiddenness, according to which God's hiddenness motivates an argument for atheism.
As Schellenberg sees it, a loving God would not make rational non-belief possible, given that God is all-just and non-belief carries with it culpability on some Christian accounts. But the ubiquity of apparently rational religious disagreement is evidence for the possibility of rational non-belief, and thus has first-order epistemic significance vis-à-vis the question of whether God exists.
Here is of course not the place to attempt to adjudicate the divine hiddenness argument.
Rather, the example is meant to be illustrative of how, generally speaking, there are two interestingly different ways to think about the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, and that this is so regardless of whether one is already inclined toward the conciliatory or steadfast view.
As a final point, it will be worth bringing together a lesson from §2 with the material surveyed in §3. In §2 it was shown that the matter of the distinction between religion and science is best understood as a standalone philosophical problem, one that is not helpfully thought of as mapping on to the theist/atheist divide. With this point in mind, it will be useful to now consider that disagreements concerning theism and atheism do not themselves settle, and should be regarded as independent of, disagreements on the matter of whether religion or science respectively offers a better method of engaging with the world and our place in it. That said, the more general structural points concerning the significance of disagreements bear importantly on the latter kind of dispute much as they do on the former. In this respect, social epistemology offers important tools for thinking critically about both kinds of disputes.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
• The task of defining theism and atheism faces an initial difficulty given the variation in what people take 'belief in God' to refer to. This initial difficulty can be overcome to some extent by stipulating that God have certain properties, e.g., the properties typically assigned to God by classical monotheistic religions.
• Atheism is typically associated with the kind of denial that is the rejection of the existence of God or other deities. Though one might also deny the existence of God in a weaker fashion, by refraining from believing in God while not outright maintaining God's nonexistence, a position typically associated with agnosticism.
• One method of support for atheism challenges the rationality of religious belief. On this strategy, belief in God is, like any other kind of belief, the sort of thing that should be defensible via publicly available evidence that anyone, not just the believer herself, should be able to accept. This assumption that religious belief is rationally appraisable is denied by fideists, who regard religious belief to be arational.
• If the ought-implies-can principle is correct, then theism/atheism are praiseworthy or blameworthy only if the matter of whether we believe in God is in some relevant sense voluntary. The more general issue of whether belief is subject to our direct control is what separates doxastic voluntarists (e.g., Clifford and James) and doxastic involuntarists (e.g., Hume and Williams).
• It is problematic to attempt to deduce conclusions about the religion/science distinction from premises about the atheism/theism distinction. Firstly, both theism and atheism have been supported on the basis of scientific considerations as well as on the basis of theological or religious considerations. Secondly, theism and atheism are positions that can be believed or disbelieved, whereas religion and science are not 'beliefs' as such (even if there are various specific beliefs characteristic to each), but rather ways of coming to form beliefs-viz., different epistemological methodologies.
• An epistemic peer, relative to is a given topic, is someone who is as cognitively competent and well informed on that topic as you are. According to the conciliatory view, rationality requires that you adjust (to some degree) your confidence about whether God exists upon finding that someone you regard as an epistemic peer on the topic of God's existence disagrees with you. The steadfast view by contrast denies this claim and permits one to rationally 'hold one's grounds' in the face of a revealed peer disagreement.
• First-order evidence directly concerns the truth of some target proposition, p; higher-order evidence doesn't bear directly on whether p is true but rather on the matter of whether one has rationally assessed the relevant first-order evidence.
• Disagreements about theism/atheism, as well as disagreements about science and religion, can potentially be either first-order or second-order epistemically significant; however, it
